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Summary 
The aim of this paper is to propose a conceptual framework for the 
design of information systems for crisis management. The framework is 
grounded in the idea that the more an organisational system is 
unstructured (such as in a crisis situation), the more we need 
information technologies (IT) which are able to promote self organizing 
processes. In addition, IT systems should also help to improve the 
shared knowledge between stakeholders in order to promote a new 
form of organisation. Following this perspective, we will first give some 
examples showing that emergence and self organization are mandatory 
processes in the first phase in a crisis. We will also address the two 
notions of robustness and resilience in order to develop a more 
efficient approach in engineering crisis systems.  
 
Introduction 
Emergent processes can play a critical role in achieving robust socio-
technical systems. This point will be illustrated in the following section 
using examples from emergency and crisis management. The ultimate 
goal of this paper is to propose a framework for designing robust socio-
complex systems based on the idea of emergent and self-organised 
processes. 
 Regulation, emergence and self-
organization in crisis management 
The two examples in this section illustrate how complex systems use 
different kinds of regulation in order to maintain their performance or 
simply to survive. Two broad categories of regulation can be identified: 
functional and structural.  
 
Of the two categories of regulation, functional regulation is the most 
common. The aim of functional regulation is to restore the initial 
functionality of the system. Classical engineering, cybernetics, and 
reliability engineering are mainly concerned with the concept of 
functional regulation. That is, when a perturbation arises in the 
environment, the regulation mechanism will return the system or its 
output to its default or expected value. Usually, the initial functionality 
of the system is maintained. However, there is no change to the internal 
structure of the system. A simple watt regulator or any regulation 
feedback mechanism exemplifies this first category of regulation.  
 
When the external perturbation increases, more complex forms of 
regulation can be seen (structural regulation). Their aim is still to 
maintain the performance of the system, but the internal structure of 
the system may be changed. This change may be intentional, for 
example, it may be provoked by an actor within the system. 
Alternatively, the structural change may emerge in a ‘non-intentional’ 
sense. The following example shows the first case of this higher level of 
regulation. 
 
 
Example 1: Structural regulation (self regulation) in a control 
room 
When an air traffic situation becomes increasingly congested, the 
coordinator of the control room assesses the situation and may 
intentionally change not only the systems parameters, but its internal 
structure (organization). This is done in order to promote the potential 
ability of the system to handle the situation (Figure 1). 
   
 
 
Fig. 1: An example of structural regulation in Air Traffic Control (ATC). When 
some sectors (shown in red) are very busy because of the large number of aircraft, they 
may be subdivided by the ATC manager and assigned to new ATC controllers 
(from Salembier, 1994). 
 
In order to be efficient, the ATC manager should have a realistic 
overview of the situation (i.e. good data from all sectors, information 
on weather conditions such as wind perturbation, etc.) in order to take 
a rational decision. 
 
With this type of regulation, it is important to note that the functional 
aim of the system is still maintained. In the example, the functional aim 
is to maintain the flow of air traffic and to avoid congestion. 
 
In degraded or crisis situations it may not be possible to fulfill this aim. 
The manager no longer has a clear view of what is happening in the 
environment (i.e. there is a lack of information, or the information may 
be incorrect, etc.). As a consequence, the manager may not be able to 
make a rational decision. At this level of crisis, emergent and self 
organizing processes usually arise to restructure the system. In some 
cases, there may be no conservation of function (Salembier & Zouinar, 
2002). That is, the emergent phenomena could change the local 
functionality of the sub-components. 
 
The next example which concerns the Hurricane Katrina crisis in 2005 
shows this concept. Here, emergence and self organization were the 
main systemic processes responsible for early recovery. 
 
  
Example 2: Complex structural (or emergent) regulation 
during Hurricane Katrina 
Soon after the arrival of the Hurricane Katrina, the communications 
infrastructure was destroyed, isolating the victims of the catastrophe 
and reducing the institutions’ coordination capacities to zero (Comfort 
& Haase, 2006). Soon after, non-institutional actors1 spontaneously 
started to restore communications using new technologies such as Wi-
Fi networks and WiMAX. Their goal was to rebuild locally the 
communication links between the crisis sites and the external world.  
These efforts happened in spite of attempts by official organisations to 
limit the volunteers’ involvement2. These spontaneous interventions are 
typical of self-organisation mechanisms which cannot be anticipated. 
(figure 2) 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1     For example, teams of people from large companies, private groups, etc. 
2 From ‘Associated Press’ (http://radioresponse.org/wordpress/?page_id=46) 
Mercury news, October 4, 2005 Mathew Fordhahl. “The spontaneous wireless projects by 
groups that simply wanted to help -- government mandate or not -- is spurring interest in how to 
deploy the latest in communications technology and expertise in a more organized fashion after future 
disasters. Teams from large companies, private groups and the military converged on the Gulf Coast 
in ad hoc fashion to set up wireless networks, all the while battling bureaucracies that didn't seem to 
understand the agility and flexibility of the technologies being marshalled”. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The dynamics of self-organization and institutional mechanisms in crisis 
situations: the case of Hurricane Katrina. The self-organization phenomenon 
(dotted curve) depicts the action of teams of volunteers who spontaneously tried to re-
establish communications. The black continuous curve shows the evolution of the 
formal organization. Note that the amplitude of the curves and their development 
over time does not have an absolute value and is shown only to illustrate the 
positioning of the self-organization phenomena in crisis situations. 
From these two examples, we can see that emergence is a mandatory 
mechanism for recovery when a socio technical system nears a crisis 
situation. If we consider designing emergency systems, it is useful to 
discriminate between the different types of regulations: a) functional, b) 
structural, c) structural and emergent or self organized.  
 
The following section develops the idea that these three levels of 
regulation can be associated with different types of engineering. 
Resilient and robust engineering will also be reexamined in light of 
these three types of regulation.  
 
From resilience to robustness engineering 
Resilience engineering focuses on situations where it is possible to 
make reliable plans and where coordinators can anticipate the situation. 
The implicit hypothesis of this approach is that the organiser or the 
regulating system has a reliable model of the environment and that the 
functions for correcting any dysfunction do not deviate from what is 
expected.   
 
Resilience engineering is based on the idea that it is always possible to 
maintain the functional organization, or at least part of it. Furthermore, 
it makes a clear distinction between the organization and the 
environment. In the case of a major crisis, these hypotheses cannot be 
maintained. In crisis situations the system no longer maintains a clear 
boundary between the organization and its environment. In addition we 
have the situation where the non-deterministic processes prevail over 
organized processes. 
 
A resilient system generally aims to restore the initial functions of the 
system without fundamentally questioning its internal structure in 
charge of the regulation (Woods, 2005, 2006). Whilst it is true that in 
some situations the structure of the system may be intentionally 
modified, this modification is always undertaken within the context of a 
process where it is a supervising structure (i.e. the meta-structure) that 
decides the organisational changes. 
 
The traditional approaches to reliability and security usually rely on 
resilient engineering. Engineers strive to return the system to its initial 
state maintaining its original functions.  
                                                 
 
From a system theory point of view, the processes linked to 
robustness are very different: 
1) They inevitably do not guarantee that the function of the system 
will be maintained. Indeed, new functions can emerge. For example, 
a new organisation or new objectives for a company, etc. 
2) It is difficult to disassociate the system from its environment since 
these two entities can be closely coupled.  
 
Robustness has become a central issue in many scientific domains from 
computing to biology, through to ecology and finance (Bonabeau & al., 
1996; Doyle & al., 2005; Kaufman, 1993; Lewontin & Goss, 2005; 
Walker & al., 1995). However, there is no globally agreed definition of 
robustness, and the situation is further blurred by its relationship to 
resilience and stability. Furthermore, according to how the term is used, 
very different theoretical or epistemological meanings may be attributed 
to the notion of robustness3.    
 
Following the distinctions made in this paper, the ergonomics of 
complex systems requires different types of engineering: 
1) Classical engineering which is based on a functional approach in 
order to control simple regulation mechanisms. 
2) Resilience engineering which deals with borderline and incidental 
situations, but which still remains within the framework of 
functional models and analytical approaches (e.g. stakeholders 
looking for ways to recover the initial situation).  
3)  Robustness engineering which refers to the behaviour of complex 
systems and distributed systems. Robustness engineering deals 
with non-deterministic processes such as those found in crisis 
situations. Only this approach lends itself to modelling and 
simulation of the self-organisation process and thus allows us to 
 
3  For a detailed analysis of the concept of robustness in various scientific domains, 
see http://santafe.edu/sfi/research/robustness.php,  
http://discuss.santafe.edu/robustness, and Robust Design: a repertoire of 
biological and engineering case studies. Oxford University press (2005). 
 
assess the role that technologies can play in this self-
organisation.  
 
Conclusion 
The objective of this article was to clarify the concepts of robustness, 
resilience and regulation in the framework of the design of socio-
technical complex systems. The hypothesis was that these concepts 
could only be clearly differentiated by considering their systemic 
properties. We have shown that resilience and robustness can be 
differentiated by the importance and dynamics of self-organised 
processes.  
 
We also showed that self-organised processes are not the result of 
causal mechanisms controllable by an organisational structure. Instead, 
they result from distributed and non-deterministic processes. 
Robustness and resilience are complementary concepts because they 
cover two types of dynamics: ? A dynamic where it is still possible to anticipate or return the 
system to its initial state. ? A dynamic where the information flow is no longer compatible 
with any organised systems.  
The true information is mainly local as a result of the crisis situation. In 
such situations, the interaction between the system and the 
environment is so strong (structural coupling) that it is no longer 
possible to maintain a clear distinction between them. At this stage, the 
system and the environment are driven by complex mechanisms such 
as self organisation, broadcasted information, within scale and cross 
scale interactions, etc. These mechanisms are in many ways 
unpredictable. However, they may generate new structures which are 
more able to cope with the new situation.  
 
In this perspective, it is important to distinguish between resilience and 
robustness engineering for the design of complex situations. Resilience 
engineering has the objective of treating abnormal situations with 
traditional organisational tools (the search for functional stability, 
anticipation in degraded mode, etc.) and tries to look for a posteriori 
causality. For example, it often tries to assess the cause of a crisis by the 
derivation of a causal tree. Nevertheless, this analytical point of view is 
inappropriate in understanding crisis situations because of their 
unstructured characteristics.  
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